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COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT

I. Introduction
Rev. Proc. 93-271 states that, generally, the Internal
Revenue Service will not treat the receipt of a partnership profits interest2 in exchange for the provision of
services, by a person in a partner capacity or in anticipation of being a partner, to or for the benefit of a
partnership as a taxable event to either the servicerendering partner or the partnership. Is Sol Diamond
dead at last? And did he die quietly?3 Not quite! The
revenue procedure also sets forth three exceptions to
this grant:
(1) if the profits interest relates to a substantially certain and predictable stream of income
from partnership assets, such as income from
high-quality debt securities or a high-quality net
lease;
(2) if within two years of receipt, the partner
disposes of the profits interest; or
(3) if the profits interest is a limited partnership interest in a 'publicly traded partnership'
within the meaning of section 7704(b) . ...
Rev. Proc. 93-27 does not specify whether nonrealization or nonrecognition applies; rather, it stipulates that "the Internal Revenue Service will not treat
the receipt of such an interest as a taxable event for the
partner or the partnership." The appropriate treatment
of the receipt is non realization if the rationale is either
(1) that the profits interest has no determinable fair
market value (or character) in year 1, or the sometimes
related notion that a mere promise to pay is not income,
or preferably (2) that receipt of a profits interest subject
to entrepreneurial risk for partner capacity services

11993-241.R.B. 1 Oune 9, 1993), electronically reproduced 93
TNT 123-7. The model for this procedure was suggested by
Chicago Bar Association. "Chicago Bar Association Says
Campbell Decision Has Left Too Many Partnerships in the
Soup," 91 TNT 58-35 (March 14, 1991).
2"Capital interest" is defined using a present liquidating
value on date of receipt of profits share. ld. sec. 2.01. A
"profits interest," usually called a profit share in this article,
is defined as any "partnership" interest other than a capital
interest. ld . .02. The regulations already define "capital interest" in other contexts. Treas. Reg. section 1.704-1(e)(1)(v); cf
section 1.721-1(B)(1). "Partnership" rules out creditors of the
partnership having a profits interest. Actually, in the eyes of
some, creditors would have a "disguised" capital interest,
but that's another story. See GCM 36702 (April 12, 1976) ("We
see no reason why the corporate cases and the [debt-equity]
principles developed therein cannot be applied to partnerships."); accord, GCM 38275 (Feb. 7, 1980); GCM 36031 (Oct.
1,1974); TAM. 8802007 (Sept. 30, 1987). How about the mirror-image genesis of sections 351 and 721? Or the fact that
corporate debt-equity litigation arose predominantly in the
context of back door integration (avoidance of taxation at
corporation and investor level on funds earned by the corporation and winding up in the hands of the investor), which
partnerships already have access to via the front door?
3Credit to Schmolka, Commentary, "Taxing Partnership
Interests Exchanged for Services: Let Diamond/Campbell
Quietly Die," 47 Tax L. Rev. 287 (1991), and, hence, Hortens tine & Ford, "Receipt of a Partnership Interest for Services: A Controversy That Will Not Die," 65 Taxes 880 (1987).
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constitutes a common law nonrealization admission to
the partnership. The appropriate treatment is nonrecognition if the rationale is an exchange under section 721
of property for a partnership (profits) interest. 4 The
Service similarly presented no rationale for either the
general rule or its inevitable exceptions. Rather, a
"Background" section recited without commentary the
following conflicting judicial positions: (1) receipt of a
partnership profits interest for services is not taxable
(the Eighth Circuit's Campbell dictum,S since the
Campbell court came to rest its decision on an inability
to value the speculative profits share) versus current

4After having thought this through, I discovered pleasing
confirmation in GCM 10092, XI-1 C.B. 114 (1932), revoked on
other grounds, GCM 26379, 1950-1 C.B. 58. (The reason and
import of the revocation are discussed at notes 172-73 and
accompanying text.) The Service was helped in the 1920s and
1930s as it formulated its partnership tax rules by the stark
simplicity of the taxing statute here prior to the 1954 code. (1)
The partnership reported an information return and did not
pay federal income tax, (2) a partner reported her share of
partnership income, and after 1934 (3) a (still) unhelpful
definition of partner, and (4) a carryover basis provision for
contributions of property to a partnership by a partner applied. Thus, Treasury argued in 1933 that "the tax law seems
to take the same view which is taken by the law generally that a partnership is not a separate entity but that it is to be
regarded as consisting of the various partners doing business
as individuals .... [T]he partnership is not a legal entity but
is simply an aggregation of individuals ." Hearings on
Revenue Revision, 1934, before the House Ways and Means
Comm., 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1933)(Statement of Dr.
Magill) ("1934 House Hearings").
sCampbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815, 821, 822 (8th Cir.
1991) (Campbell II) ("The commentators generally agree that
the nonrecognition principles of section 721 do not apply to
a service partner because a service partner does not contribute
property in exchange for his partnership interest. ... We also
agree... Probably more relevant to our analysis, however, is
section 707 of the Internal Revenue Code, which supports
Campbell's argument [that a service partner who receives a
profits interest in exchange for services provided to a
partnership does not realize income upon receipt of such
interest and therefore no taxable event occurs] ." String cites of
the undying literature can be found in Cuff, "Campbell v. Commissioner: Is There Now 'Little or No Chance' of Taxation of
'Profits' Interest in a Partnership?" 59 Taxes 643, 644 n.2 (1991);
Section of Taxation, Los Angeles County Bar Association,
"Comments on Taxation of the Receipt of a Profits Partnership
Interest for Services," n.1 (May 4, 1991), electronically reproduced
91 TNT 130-26 (,,1991 LA Bar Report") (Cuff principal author);
Hortenstine & Ford, supra note 3 at 880 n .1; updated in Friedman, "Partnership Securities," 1 Fla. Tax Rev. 522 at n.4 (1993),
electronically reproduced 93 TNT 226-166 (Nov. 3, 1993). To these
lists must be added the useful "Colloquium on Partnership
Taxation," 47 Tax L. Rev. 247-312 (1991). For a tight, thoughtful
policy analysis of the little explored treatment of the partnership itself upon admission of a service partner, see Gunn,
"Partnership Interest for Services: Partnership Gain and Loss?"
47 Tax Notes 699, 705 (May 7, 1990) ("One of the few general
principles that seem to have governed the drafting of subchapter K is this: Partners do not recognize gains and losses upon
dealing with their partnerships unless recognition is needed to
avoid negative basis or some other departure from fundamental tax principles.").
TAX NOTES, March 28, 1994
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taxability under section 83 (the Tax Court in Campbe1l 6
and the district court in St. John 7 ); and (2) most courts
found the value of such an interest too speculative to
be taxable (Eighth Circuit in Campbell and the district
court in St. John), but the Seventh Circuit, in the
landmark Diamonds decision almost two decades ago,
implicitly choosing an entity approach to the problem,
found the value of such a profits interest readily determinable when it was sold three weeks after receipt. 9
Professor Davis in his article "Discretionary Justice A Preliminary Inquiry,"10 posits just such a first step in
rulemaking when the agency is not yet certain about
the general principle.u Perhaps the IRS's National Office is more certain than some courts about the principles of subchapter K as well as its detail in this context, but a stream can rise no higher than its source,12
unless dammed .

Three avenues to becoming a partner by rendering
(or promising to render) services are implicit in the
authorities: 13
(1) From the 1954 code on, the first, and usually only, mode of judicial analysis of taxation of
receipt of a profits share for services has been to
apply section 721 governing contributions of
property to a partnership in exchange for a
partnership interest. The sticking point in this
scenario has been that "services" do not constitute "property" for purposes of the purportedly comparable section 351 14 governing
contributions of property to a "controlled" corporation in exchange for a stock interest in the
transferee corporation.

6Campbell v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1990-236, rev'd, 943 F.2d
815 (8th Cir. 1991) (Campbell D.
1St. John v. United States, 1984-1 USTC Para. 9158, 53
AFTR2d Para. 84-718 (CIi>. Ill., Nov. 16, 1983); noted in
"Receipt of a Partnership Profits Interest for Services: St. John
v. United States," 5 Va. Tax Rev. 127 (1985).
8Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974)
(Diamond II) Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit solely addressed Cowan, "Receipt of an Interest in Partnership Profits
in Consideration for Services: The Diamond Case," 27 Tax L.
Rev. 161 (1972). 492 F.2d at 298. The aggregate argument of
Lane, "Sol Diamond, The Tax Court Upsets the Service
Partner," 46 So. Cal. L. Rev. 239 (1973), is hard to counter and
would have supplied an, if not the, "explanation of why this
[nonrealization] should be so," which the Seventh Circuit
could not find in the articles it cited. Talk about missed opportunities!
9Rev. Proc. 93-27 did not mention the Tax Court's analysis
in Campbell I of tax shelter value, which is rather convincing.
See Smith, "Campbell v. Commissioner: The Eighth Circuit
Adds Uncertainty to the Tax Treatment Regarding the Receipt
of a Profits-Only Partnership Interest in Exchange for Services," 93 TNT 218-82 at n.88 (Oct. 25, 1993). Upon rereading
and further reflection, I now see as even more convincing
Hortenstine & Ford's insight that an open transaction rationale for nontaxation of the receipt of a profits share for services
is inconsistent with immediate "access to the benefits of
partner status."
IODavis," Discretionary Justice, A Preliminary Inquiry,"
103 (LSU Press 1969); see also Mashaw, "Bureaucratic Justice,
Managing Social Disability Claims," 103-22 (Yale Univ. Press
1983).
liThe Service elsewhere has considered simply using
bright-line tests without committing itself to theories. See,
e.g., "Service Ponders Environmental Cleanup Costs;
Washington Uncertain of Outcome," 93 TNT 102-10, May 12,
1993 ("Service Ponders") .
12United States v. Greenleaf, 546 F.2d 123, 126 (5th Cir. 1977)
(partnership rights against self incrimination in the context
of IRS subpoena like "a stream can not rise above its source,
the partner's individual rights") - Unde nil magis generator
ipse. Study of selected General Counsel Memoranda of the
1970s and 1980s (which frequently rose to the level of quality
law review articles of the time on tax issues and consider so
many issues I have thought about over the years that I need
chortle) leaves me with the impression that usually the Ser(Footnote 12 continued in next column.)

vice in fact follows case law or legislative history (down or up
to hearings and floor debate on occasion) in interpreting the
code. Cf. "Service Ponders," note 11 supra ("The denial of deductibility [in the Toxic Waste TAM] was not based on environmental policy, and the current review of the treatment of environmental costs will not consider environmental policy,
Carrington said. 'Environmental impact is an issue for legislators and policy makers. My job is to only interpret the law,'
he said."). For a noteworthy exception, see TAM 9128050 (April
4, 1991). The notion of limitation of rulings to reflect only case
law development conflicts with notion of evolutionary or common-law administrative interpretation. But in a world of "substantial authority" the maxim is in a very practical sense true
- particularly with 1-in-3 standard for return preparers and
taxpayer ability to rely on expert advice. In a world of actively
leading and administratively shaping the law, here at least the
maxim should be more honored in the breach. The good news
is that section 707(a)(2) authorizes legislative regulations and
with a clear aggregate mandate in defining a partner who
contributes services for a partnership interest. The equally
good news is that the Service has decades of ruling experience
and hence fact patterns for ruling examples under the approaches suggested. I have every confidence that the drafters
of such regulations can rise far above the headwaters of the
incompletely thought out or at least laid out case law here.
13Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit in Campbell comeS as
close as the courts have gotten since the 1939 code to acknowledging the common-law nonrealization way of admission to a partnership, based on the 1984 legislative history of
section 707(a)(2) or otherwise. On the other hand, some in
the Service have clearly articulated the concept of commonlaw nonrealization when services are contributed to the conduct of a venture at a profit. See notes 18-26 and accompanying text. This whole notion is much clearer in the taxpayer's
briefs in Campbell on appeal, which should be read prior to
reading the opinion. Then the court's references to sections 707
and 721 indicate it accepts the property/services section 707
common-law admission to the partner relation dichotomy that
Turlington (counsel for Campbell at planning, Tax Court, and
appellate court stages), others, and I drew independently from
the 1984 legislative history. The clearest and most extensive
prior discussion of this is Hortenstine & Ford, supra note 3 at
909. Cf. Cuff, supra note 5 at 653-54 (Campbell II "suggests, but
does not hold, that section 707(a)(2) is the only way to tax the
service 'profits' interest partner.").
14Now section 351(d) so holds, but so did 1939 code case
law. See authorities cited by Diamond, 56 T.C 530 at 545 n.14
(1971) (Diamond I) . For criticism of the parity notion, see notes
152-188 and accompanying text infra.
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(2) Apart from a sale or exchange of property
analysis, 1939 code cases fashioned a test based
on an aggregate analysis for determining whether
a partnership existed for tax purposes in the family partnership area, where typically one family
member provided services and another might
provide capital (often originating as well with the
service provider). Commissioner v. Culbertson, a
landmark 1949 Supreme Court family partnership decision, confirmed that the test for this purpose was whether the parties - in good faith and
for a business purpose - contributed services or
capital to the present conduct of an enterprise. 15
The power of this federal common law concept
of a partnership can be seen in its adoption elsewhere, where partnership status is determinative
for federal nonrevenue statutes. 16 While the
specific Culbertson context of family partnerships
has been codified (but not preempted l7 ) since
15337 U.S. 733, 742 (1949). The standard was first fashioned
in Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946), but Culbertson is
more frequently cited. For detailed discussions of the determinative Culbertson factor of objective to carryon business for
joint profit (consonant with an aggregate analysis) see Bergford
v. Commissioner, 93 TNT 264-10 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 1993); GCM
36961 (Dec. 21, 1976); GCM 36436 (Sept. 25, 1975); TAM
8802007 (Sept. 30, 1987); PLR 9249016 (Sept. 8, 1992). The
similarity between this test and Justice Frankfurter's sincediscredited dictum "goods or services" definition of a trade or
business (see Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987);
Lee, "A Blend of Old Wines in a New Wineskin: Section 183
and Beyond," 29 Tax L. Rev. 347, 452-64 (1974) ("Lee, Section
183") (criticizing "holding one's self out" doctrine along lines
later reinvented by the Supreme Court because overlooked by
all commentary at the time seeking to shape the Court's direction) has gone unnoticed in the cases, rulings, and the literature, according to my research and searches of the data bases.
16Connors v. Ryan's Coal Co. 923 F.2d 1461, 1466-67 (11th
Cir. 1991) (Employee Retirement Income Security Act liability
of joint venturer); accord, Central States Pension Fund v.
Winstead, 991 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1993); Burke v. Friedman,
556 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1977) (partner is not employee for
purposes of unfair employment practices under Tower/Culbertson goods or services for conduct of venture with community of interest in profits) .
17Arguably, Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 330 (1937)
(owner of capital by gift or otherwise is taxable on income it
produces) was codified, not Culbertson (which held when a
partnership must be recognized). Stanback v. Commissioner,
271 F.2d 514, 518 (4th Cir. 1959). I think both are manifestations of a more general substance-of-the-transaction/ antiassignment-of-income principle or standard. PLR 8934014
(May 23,1989); cf TAM 8802007 (Sept. 30, 1987) (citing Tower) .
The starting point in researching "assignment of income" has
to be Professor Eustice's many articles, as acknowledged by
the Service in Action on Decision S.c. Johnson (October 7,
1975) ("author of the leading articles in the assignment of
income area," citing Eustice, "Contract Rights, Capital Gain,
and Assignment of Income - The Ferrer Case," 20 Tax L. Rev.
1 (1964»; accord, GCM 34152 (June 26, 1969) (same article);
see also GCM 39252 (July 3, 1984) (citing Lyon & Eustice,
"Assignments of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the
P.G. Lake Case," 17 Tax L. Rev. 295 (1962); accord, GCM 3056
(Sept. 26, 1972) (same article). I, too, started with Eustice in
(Footnote 17 continued in next column.)
1736

1951 by the predecessor to section 704(e), the Service and the courts have frequently relied (under
the 1954, and now the 1986, codes) on Culbertson's
contribution of goods or services to the partnership while participating in the community of
profits and losses to determine whether "the common-law concept of the partnership relation"18

my initial and later writings touching on assignment of income. See Lee, "Section 482 and the Integrated Business
Enterprise," 57 Va. L. Rev. 1376,1409-10 (1971); Lee & Bader,
"Contingent Income Items and Cost Basis Corporate Acquisitions: Correlative Adjustments and Clearer Reflection of Income," 12]. Corp. L. 137, 187-96 (1987). In any event, family
partnership issues apart from section 704(e) still arise where
capital is not a material income-producing factor. Conversely,
section 704(e) determines partner status in a nonfamily context where capital is a material income-producing factor.
Evans v. Commissioner, 447 F.2d 547, 549 (7th Cir. 1971).
18GCM 36113 (Dec. 19, 1974). (This article frequently cites
General Counsel Memoranda, Technical Advice Memoranda,
Actions on Decision, and Private Letter Rulings not as precedents, but for their reasoning. To accentuate that perspective,
the text often refers to the views of "some" in the Service,
rather than the Service holds, etc.) The Joint Committee Staff
paraphrased the Culbertson test without attribution. "In
providing these new rules, Congress was mindful that to be
considered partners for tax purposes, persons must, among
other things, pool their assets and labor for the joint production of profit." Joint Comm. Staff, General Explanation of the
Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 226
(JCS-41-84 Dec. 31, 1984) ("1984 Bluebook"). Other administrative rulings not citing Culbertson employ similar tests
for partnership status. Rev. Rul. 75-43, 1975-1 C.B. 383, considered in GCM 35980 (Sept. 4, 1974) ("while X will receive
a percentage of net profits and is obligated to make good
losses on the cattle feeding operation that exceed 10 percent
of A's commitment, such profit and loss sharing arises under
the guarantee agreement and not because X has a proprietor's
interest in the net profits or a proprietor's obligation to share
losses." Joining in the community of the enterprise was the
missing element barring partnership status.) For discussion
of Culbertson's judicial progeny in this context, see Hortenstine & Ford, supra note 3, at 887-88, 901-02, 905-06, 909-11
(GCM 36346 (July 25, 1977), by reference to Rev. Rul. 75-43
incorporated the Culbertson principle).
For reasoning and/ or factors decisive to determination of
(a) such mutual responsibility, see GCM 38856 (May 19, 1982)
(detailed facts of "exercise [of] mutual control over and assume responsibilities of the enterprise"); TAM 8222079 (Feb.
24, 1982) ("parties exercised mutual control over and assumed mutual responsibility for the enterprise" which was
to "construct, operate and maintain a multi-story office
building"); TAM 8105030 (Oct. 29, 1980); TAM 8026023
(March 31,1980); PLR 8052065 (Sept. 30, 1980); (b) "proprietary
interest," see TAM 8026023 (March 31,1980); TAM 7847101 (no
date given); TAM 7841001 (May [no day given] 1978); TAM
7830006 (March 29, 1978); and (c) interest in profits, see GCM
37077 (April 1, 1977) (purported general partners received
fees as agents not partners). GCM 36961 (Dec. 21, 1976) noted
that "the relevant factors have been described in a different
manner [than by Culbertson]. E.g., (1) a contract, express or
implied, that a joint venture be formed; (2) the contribution
of money, property and/or services by the venturers; (3) an
agreement for joint proprietorship and control; and (4) an
. agreement to share profits. S.& M. Plumbing Co., Inc., 55 T.C.
(Footnote 18 continued on next page.)
TAX NOTES, March 28, 1994
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exists in the following contexts: (a) what is the
proper tax entity to make elections~19 (b) ~hether
the other purported venturer was mcurrmg specially treated (developmental) expenditures,2o
(c) whether "principals" in an accounting firm
were partners,21 (d) whether a partnership existed under the "not very helpful"22 code defini-

702, 707 (1971), acq., 1971-2 e.B. 3; Hyman Podell, 55 T.e. ~9,
431 (1970)." {Footnote combined with text)). Freeze v. Umted
States, 455 F.2d 1146, 1151 (10th Gr. 1972), insightfully speaks
of the "joint venture quality" of the actual relationship of the
alleged partners "contemplated by ... Culbertson ." I like the
succinct PLR 8332076 (May 10, 1983): "From the many tax
cases defining the relationship which gives rise to partnership classification, one may distill the following objective
indicators of requisite intent: (1) the parties must express an
intent that a business venture be established; (2) the parties
share in profits and losses of the venture as proprieto~s [~d
proprietresses) and (3) the parties have made a contnbution
of capital or services to the venture." See also GCM 35709
(March 6, 1974).
19Demirjian v. Commissioner, 457 F.2d 1, 5 (3rd Cir. 1972);
PLR 8916034 (January 23, 1989) (section 1033 election).
2°TAM 8802007 (Sept. 30, 1987); TAM 8302002 (Oct. 5, 1981)
(no partnership for mine developmental expenditures); TAM
8133021 (April 30, 1981) (intangible drilling costs); cf TAM
7704080851A (April 8, 1977).
21 Rev. Rul. 77-332, 1977-2 e.B. 483 (test whether "the person has contributed money, goods, labor, or skill for the purpose of carrying on a trade, profe.s sion, or. business, ~d participates in the community of 10terest 10 the prohts and
losses."), considered in GCM 36307 (June 13, 1975) (spells out
significance of participating in such community); accord, TAM
8001008 (Oct. 1, 1979); cf TAM 8753003 (Sept. 29, 1987)
(secretarial services of one spouse for other CPA spouse did
not amount to partnership); TAM 8742007 (June 26,1987) (performance of secretarial and general agricultural services of 30
hours a week plus allowing personally held land to be farmed
by spouse did not amount to joint venture); TAM 8648006
(Aug. 25, 1986) (contribution of services by one party and of
orchard by the other together with mutual cont~ol of orch~d
growing operations did not constitute partnership not shar10g
of mutual proprietary interest in the net profits or of control
over income and withdrawals). Case law sometimes does not
reach the same results. Craig v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 378
(N.D. S.D. 1978), Action on Decision CC-1979-46 (facts dose
to TAM 8742007; held partnership).
22GCM 37077 (April 1, 1977) (unusually detailed, helpful
analysis of common law factors of Luna v. Commissioner, 42
T.e. 1067 (1964), the major alternative precedent to Culbertson
used by the Service in determining partnership status); see
also GCM 36113 (Dec. 19, 1974) (because partnership is so
broadly defined in section 7701(a)(2) that existen~e of a
partnership does not lend itself to statutory analYSIS). For
additional detailed, helpful consideration of Luna factors, see
GCM 36961 (Dec. 21 1976); GCM 36436 (Sept. 25, 1975) (ultimately turned on lack of mutual control; evaluation of substantial hazards of litigating position) . I am beginning to
believe that such mutual control often goes to the essence of
the aggregate notion of "like a proprietr~ss." For one t~g,
active conduct of a rental real estate busmess by tenants-1Ocommon constitutes a partnership. Treas. Reg. section 1.761l(a); Rev. RuJ. 75-374, 1975-2 e.B. 261 ("additional services . ..
furnished by the co-owners or through their agent"); PLR
8916034 (Jan. 23, 1989); PLR 8330093 (April 29, 1983). Manage(Footnote 22 continued in next column.)
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tion,23 (e) whether sale of an interest in profits
from sale of business assets was realized as an
employee with a right to share in proceeds from
the sale of her employer or as a partner,24 (f)
whether a rental pool of condominium units
pending sale in a "condominium conversion"
constituted a partnership under section 761,25 and
(g) when a member became a partner for (retroactive or not) allocation of partnership income or
10ss,26 Culbertson progeny could have envisioned

ment or operational activities go to the heart of active conduct of a trade or business, a question on which my scholarship has been recognized by those who matter. See GCM
36387 (August 25, 1975) (citing Lee, "Functional Divisions and
Other Corporate Separations Under Section 355 After Rilfferty,"
27 Tax L. Rev. 453 (1972»; GCM 36205 (March 21, 1975) (id.);
GCM 36069 (November 5,1974) (id.); as has my scholarship on
aggregate-entity Subchapter K niches such as the leve! .for
determining profit motive, GCM 37190 (July 7, 1977) (clt1Og
Lee, "Section 183," supra note 15); GCM 36577 (Feb. 26, 1976);
and on profit motive requirement for trade or business status
generally, Portland Golf Club v. Commissioner, 497 U.S. 154, 171
at 174 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring and pointing to Lee,
"Section 183," supra, on case-law origins of section 18~ regulation factors) (taxpayer's central argument based on Id. as to
"profit," see petition for certiorari).
23TAM 8222008 (Feb. 24, 1982) (arrangement to construct,
operate, and maintain multistory office building co~stitut~d
partnership under section 761 and Culbertson), conSIdered 10
GCM 38856 (May 19, 1982); TAM 8105030 (Oct. 29, 1980);
TAM 8001018 (Oct. 1, 1979) (starting point under sections 761
and 7701(a)(2) is Culbertson standard: "whether all the facts
regarding X and Y' s relations~p reveal that X was. established for the purpose of carrY10g on a trade, professlOn, or
business and that Y has contributed money, goods, labor, or
skill to X to further such a purpose and participates in the
community of interest in the profits and losses."); GCM 37193
(July 13, 1977) ("a person must contribute either capital or
services to be recognized as a partner"); GCM 36984 (Jan. 18,
1977); GCM 36113 (Dec. 19, 1974) ("the common-law concept
of the partnership relation allows the partners maximum
flexibility in determining what each will contribute, how the
operation will be run, and how the gains o~ loss~s .~ill be
allocated. The code itself accommodates this fleXIbility by
providing for the recognition of the partners'. shares of incom.e,
gain, loss, deduction, or credit as expressed 10 the partn~rship
agreement, unless the principal purpose of that allocation IS
tax avoidance or evasion."); TAM 8003010 (Sept. 27, 1979)
(professional corporation could be member of professional
partnership); GCM 36961 (Dec. 21, 1976) (good di~cussion of
mutual profit-sharing requirement in film production shelter
context); see also PLR 8948020 (Sept. 1, 1989).
4
2 Freese v. United States, 455 F.2d 1146, 1151 (10th Gr. 1972).
25TAM 8413003 (Nov. 30, 1983).
26Rev. Rul. 77-119, 1977-1 e.B. 177 (Horst precludes retroactive allocations to new partners); TAM 7606299220A (June 29,
1976) (Culbertson precludes such retroactive allocations), considered in GCMs 36778 and 36835 (June 29 and Sept. 7, 1976,
respectively) ("To interpret code section 761(c) as providing
that persons who are partners at the time ~f a modifica~on
are also to be viewed as partners for the entire year to whIch
the modification relates would thus be a direct reversal of
the result in Culbertson" since neither goods nor services had
been supplied by the partner all through the year). The shift
from Culbertson to Horst reflects Rodman v. Commissioner, 542
F.2d 845, 857 (2d Gr. 1976).
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such contributions of services or capital as being
made pursuant to section 721 granting nonrecognition to exchanges of property for a partnershiE
interest; they never said one way or the other. 7
But the toll of taxation triggered by that
provision' s inapplicability to services 28 would
not have rung true when compared with the practical approach that the Culbertson progeny seem
to have sought.29 The idea that Culbertson's "common law partnership relation" rests on a common
law nonrealization upon performing or promising to perform partner capacity services in exchange for an entrepreneurial risk profits share
only rings more true. In any event, Culbertson
more recently has been so read, particularly in
the context of the legislative history to the 1984
amendments to section 707, which rests on an

27A computer search of cites for Culbertson or Tower or Luna
within 25 words of section 721 yielded only one entry and it
was to p . 721 of a cited authority. Actually, Culbertson itself
was determined under the 1939 code, which contained neither
a nonrecognition nor a nonrealization provision governing
contributions to a partnership. There was only a judicial and
administrative practice. H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 68 (1954) ("Contributions to a partnership will have the
same effect under the proposed provisions as under present
practice.") (Emphasis added); Hearings on Revenue Revision
before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 83rd Cong.,
2d Sess. 1381 (1953) (describing ABA proposed nonrecognition
upon contribution of property to a partnership in exchange
for a partnership interest as "codifi ... [cation of] what is
generally recognized as present law.") (Statement of Mark
Johnson, for ABA).
28Diamond I pointed out that section 721 simply didn't
apply to a contribution of services because "a contribution
of services is not a contribution of 'property. "' 56 T.C. at 545.
The central thesis of this article is that a common law admission yields nonrealization apart from section 721 as to a contribution of services, just as the better common law or administrative "practice" yielded nonrealization as to
contributions of either property or services under the 1939
code and earlier revenue acts. Section 721 codified only the
contribution-of-property part of that "practice."
29The Supreme Court in United States v. Bayse, 410 U.S. 441,
449 (1973), a partnership tax authority in its own right, read
Culbertson as illustrating "a foundational rule, which this
Court described as ' the first principle of income taxation; that
income must be taxed to him who earns it. "' Accord, PLR
8934014 (May 23, 1989). Bayse may illustrate Professor Gunn's
insight as to Subchapter K's bias toward nonrealization,
Gunn, supra note 5 - what I would call an aggregate approach - in this case in the context of partner-partnership
dealings unless departure is needed to avoid a more grievous
departure from a fundamental tax principle. Subchapter K
always has been along precisely this fault line. This analysis
is close to that adopted in American Law Institute, Federal
Income Tax Policy, Subchapter K, Proposals of the American
Law Institute on Taxation of Partners 523-32 (ALI 1984)
(adopted 1982) ("1982 ALI Proposals"). Bayse also can be read
as limiting entity to information gathering and reporting,
which might include assignment of income up to the
partnership'S door. The aggregate approach as embodied in
Culbertson polices assignment of income within the partnership. See note 17 supra.
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aggregate approach to entry of a services partner
for a profits share. 30 That is the evolving third
avenue for nonrealization upon receipt of a
profits share for services to the partnership.
(3) The legislative history to the 1984 amendments to section 707 governing transactions between a partner and her partnershiE not only
rests on an aggregate methodology, 1 but contemplates that a person performing partnercapacity services for a partnership in exchange
for a partnership allocation of partnership income and subsequent distribution subject to
entrepreneurial risks (presumably of profits
rather than of distributions) will be treated as
becoming a partner under Treasury regulations
defining "partner" with rules to prevent abuses. 32
The Treasury staff further explains in the 1984
Blue Book that
[t]he regulations should provide rules fo r
when persons who formally become partners
after performing services for . . . the partnership
are to be treated as partners at the time of the
provision of services .... 33
The drafters of the 1984 amendments to section 707
intended that where the services were not rendered in

30

1984 Bluebook, supra note 18, at 226.
31See notes 222-234 infra and accompanying text. My understanding here is shared by the drafters of the American
Bar Association, "Proposal to Amend the Regulations under
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to Define a Partnership Capital Interest and a Partnership Profits Interest, and to Clarify
the Tax Treatment of Compensatory Transfers of Both Forms
of Partnership Interests" (April 17, 1987), electronically
reproduced 87 TNT 91-24 (May 11, 1987) ("1987 ABA Section
of Taxation Report"). I have heard this aggregate analysis
derived from the 1984 legislative history described as the
Hortenstine approach, presumably after Hortenstine & Ford,
supra note 3 at 908-10 (appears to argue both sides quite well,
though). I had the idea earlier when I came back to partnership taxation in 1986 after a 10-year absence, but didn't
publish it first and who knows when they first had the idea.
If I were to pick an individual's name as the first to bring
these notions out in print, it would be Charles Egerton from
his work on the above report. This 1987 report contained the
thought in embryonic form. I find the Tax Section's 1992
report, also primarily prepared by Egerton, the best professional treatment of this analysis of the profit shares for services problem. American Bar Association Section of Taxation,
"Report on the Tax Consequences of the Receipt of a Partnership Profits Interest for Services" Guly 31, 1992), electronically
reproduced 92 TNT 223-40 (November 5, 1992) ("1992 ABA Tax
Section Report").
32S. Rep . No. 169 (Vol I), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 232 (1984)
("1984 Senate Report"); H.R. Rep . No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 861 (1984) ("1984 Conference Report") . The House
amendments to section 707 would have applied only if a
direct payment would have been a capital expenditure. The
House bill also provided that partners joining at the end of
a series of transactions would be treated as partners for the
entire series. H.R. Rep. No. 432 (Part 2), 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
1221 (1984) ("1984 House Report"). The Senate Finance and
Conference Committees believed existing Treasury
regulatory authority could handle it.
331984 Bluebook, supra note 18, at 233.
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a partner capacity or the allocation-cum-distribution
was not subject to entrepreneurial risk as to payment,
the rendering of services and the payment for them
would be treated as occurring between a third party
and the partnership 34 - i.e., the entity approach, which
is entirely proper here since the partner is not behaving
"like a proprietress," the policy standard for aggregate
treatment. 35 But what about the service provider who
passes the "like a proprietress" standard on both the
performance and payment ends? The drafters of section 707(a)(2) in 1984 envisioned a Culbertson-like test
under which the aggregate face of an invigorated section 707 would effect nonrealization events as to the
partner and the partnership, i.e., her other partners,
with respect to her performance of the services and her
receipt of the profits share.36 Such a receipt is not "payment."37 The proof can be found in the following passage from the 1984 committee reports:
The committee does not intend that this
provision [section 707(a)(2») will apply in every
instance in which a partner acquires an interest
in a partnership and also performs services or
transfers property to the partnership. In particular, the committee does not intend to repeal
the general rule under which gain or loss is not
recognized on a contribution of property in
return for a partnership interest (sec. 721) or to

apply this new provision in cases in which a partner
receives an allocation (or an increased allocation) for
an extended period to reflect his contribution of
property or services to the partnership provided the
facts and circumstances indicate that the partner is
receiving the allocation in his capacity as a partner
[emphasis added).38

34Id., at 226. Technically, the Bluebook is written by staff,
but so are the committee reports. The difference is the chairman signs off on the latter and may be expected to know all
the bottom line decisions described in the Report. See 128
Congo Rec. (Part 12) 16918 (Senate July 19, 1982) (unstaged
colloquy between Senators Bob Dole, R-Kan., and Bill
Armstrong, R-Colo.). 1 would not expect the chairman to be
responsible for knowing all of the additional bottom line,
hopefully much more narrow, decisions embodied in the
Bluebook. Pending regulations, however, taxpayers and the
Service should be able to rely on decisions reflected in either
equally. Once interpretive regulations are promulgated, the
different weight that ought to be given to decisions reflected
in the Committee Report and additional decisions reflected in
any accompanying Bluebook appears to me about right in the
existing distinction drawn by the Federal Circuit between
binding authority and contemporaneous interpretation of experts.
35See notes 79-84 infra and accompanying text.
36
1 support and advocate this approach because, in addition to the legislative intent, it fully comports with an aggregate approach to subchapter K's problems, other than
those strictly relating to collecting and reporting income.
That exception has been read pretty widely though. Ford V.
Commissioner, 6 T.e. 499, 501 (1946), acq., 1946-2 e.B. 2.
37 See note 72 infra.
38
1984 Senate Report, supra note 32, at 226 (1984) (Emphasis added); 1984 House Report, supra note 32, at 1219.
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Observe the following parallelism: (1) contribution
of property and applicability of section 721, and (2)
contribution of services and (a) inapplicability of section 707(a)(2)(A) separate entity and hence "payment" treatment, but also implicitly (else why the
duplicate predicates), (b) inapplicability of section
721's nonrecognition shield, yet (c) implicit nonrecognition, since recognition would in effect mean
applicability of section 707(a)(2). What does apply to
contribution of services? The committee report
answers this conundrum: Legislative regulations are
to determine whether "the service performer or
property transferor is actually a partner."39 The committee report goes on to list six factors to be "considered" in making such determination, which are
discussed in section II.A.2 of this article. But the
report also sketched the functional policy standard
for determining partner status relating to the performance of services: "nonabusive allocations that
reflect the various economic conditions of the
partners."40 And the passage italicized above itself
echoes the following High Court CulbertsonlTower
standard for determining whether a partnership exists:
" ... when persons join together their money,
goods, labor, or skill for the purpose of carrying
on a trade, profession, or business and when there
is a community of interest in the profits and
loses."41
McKee, Nelson & Whitmire believe that an apparent premise of new section 707(a)(2)(a) "is that
the service provider is not taxed under sections 61
and 83 upon receipt of an interest in partnership
profits."42 This would seem to be the case as long as
a "like a proprietress" standard is met with the
rendering and payment for the services, and the
above quoted committee report confirms such a
premise.
The path suggested by this reading of the 1984 legislative history was less an innovation and more a
codification (this time in the legislative history) of the
Service's understanding of the current law or "practice." Seven years earlier, General Counsel Memorandum 37193 (sanctioning a retroactive allocation to a
service partner of 5 percent of an unexpected partnership profit of $400,000, or $20,000, for discovery,
promotion, and preliminary contact work he performed prior to the partnership'S formation) provided
a road map to the common law "admission to a

1984 Senate Report, supra note 32, at 227.
1984 Senate Report, supra note 32, at 226. Thus, "[aJn
allocation and distribution provided for a service partner
under the partnership agreement which subjects the partner
to significant entrepreneurial risk as to both the amount and
fact of payment generally should be recognized as a distributive share and a partnership distribution . ... " Id. at 227.
41Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 740, quoting Tower, 327 U.S. at 286.
421 McKee, Nelson & Wittrnire, Federal Taxation of Partnerships, para. 5.02[1J[bJ (2d ed. 1990).
39

40
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partnership" notion through the subchapter K code
sections. 43
4J"The proposed revenue ruling holds that the payment is a
distribution of part of the partner's distributive share and that,
as such, is includable in his taxable year within or with which
ends the taxable year of the partnership in which the income
was earned. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, sections 702, 706(a), and 731
[hereinafter cited as Code]. We agree with this conclusion. . ..
The primary concern of the proposed revenue ruling is
whether the payment of $20,000 to A is (1) a distributio~ of
part of his distributive share taxable under Code section
702(a), Code section 706(a), and Code section 731, (2) a
'guaranteed payment' under Code section 707(c), or (3) compensation for services rendered other than in a capacity as
partner under Code section 707(a). Profits received by a
partner are taxable in accordance with Code section 702(a),
Code section 706(a), and Code section 731 unless Code section 707(a) or Code section 707(c) applies. Edward T. Pratt, 64
T.e. 203, 210 (1975), afr d in part and rev 'd in part, 550 E2d 1023
(5th Cir. 1977).
Treas. Reg. section 1.707-1(a) provides in part that transfers of money or property by a partner to a partnership as
contributions are not included within the provisions of Code
section 707(a). In all cases, the substance of the transaction
will govern rather than its form. This distinction betw~en
contributions of money or property and transfers to which
Code section 707(a) applies is also recognized for purposes
of Code section 721, which deals with nonrecognition of gain
or loss on contributions. See Treas. Reg. section 1.721-1(a).
Although in applying this distinction, Treas. Reg. section
1.707-1(a) and Treas. Reg. section 1.721-1(a) expressly refer
only to transfers of money or property, we see no reason why
the same rule should not apply to the performance of services. When a partner performs services for a partnership
and receives compensation therefor, Code section 707(a)
should not apply if those services represent a contribution to
the partnership and the compensation is merely a return
upon that contribution.
In the proposed revenue ruling, A performed discovery,
promotion, and preliminary contact work prior to the formation of the partnership. However, he transferred to the
partnership all the rights and benefits attributable to that
work. The fact that he performed the services prior to formation of the partnership might conceivably raise a question
whether his transfer to the partnership consisted of property
rather than services. As discussed above, however, this question should not be relevant in determining the application of
Code section 707(a). What is relevant for purposes of that
section is whether the transfer is in substance a contribution
to the partnership .
In determining whether a transfer of money or property
to a partnership constitutes a contribution, as distinguished
from a sale, exchange, loan, or rental transaction, the same
criteria used in connection with corporate debt-equity questions are to be applied. See Joseph W. Hambuechen, 43 T.e. 90
(1964); GCM 36702, *** 1-415-74 (April 12, 1976), GCM 36031
'**, 1-157-73 (Oct. I, 1974). The regulations state that if a
transfer of property by a partner to a partnership results in
the receipt by the partner of money other consideration,. including a promissory obligation fixed in amount and tune
for payment, the transaction will be treated as a sale or exchange under Code section 707 rather than a contribution
under Code section 721 . Treas. Reg. section 1.721-1(a). By
analogy these criteria should also be applied in determining
whether the performance of services for a partnership constitutes a 'sale or exchange' of such services or a contribution.
(Footnote 43 continued in next column.)
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Implicitly receiving "an increase in his proprietary
interest in partnership profits" was not thought to
come under section 721. Accordingly, following the
aggregate policy manifested in the 1984.legislative .history of section 707(a)(2), the future sectIon 707 legIs lative regulations on the "reserved" topic of "Disguised
payments for services" should eit~er (a) flesh o~t thi;:
notion and Culbertson's "commumty of the busmess,
with the help of ample existing rulings along those
definitional lines in illustrating when receipt of a
profits share for partner-capacity serv.ice,~ is n~t payment, or (2) treat past "partner-capacIty servIces or

In the proposed revenue ruling, A receives no consider~
tion for his services other than a share of the partnership
profits. Although many factors must be considered in dete~
mining whether a particular transaction constitutes a con tnbution, the fact that a transferor of property or renderer of
services receives only a right to share in profits should
generally be given more weight than the other factors considered. Cf. GCM 36412, ••• 1-324-73 Oan. 20, 1975); see also,
GCM 36702, supra; Portage Plastics Co . v. United States, 301
ESupp. 684 (W.D. Wisc. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 470 E 2d
308 (7th Cir. 1972).
Arguably, a person otherwise qualifying ~s a p~rtne r
could receive an additional share of partnership prohts for
services performed as an agent of the partnership rather than
as a partner. Cf. GCM 37077, ••• 1-49-77 (April I, 1977) and
GCM 36961, "', 1-277-76 (Dec. 21, 1976). Presumably, such
services would not be considered contributions to the
partnership and Code section 707(a) would apply. However,
it is the partnership agreement that defines the scope of the
partnership, that is, the contributions of the partners an?
their rights and obligations with respect to such cont~l
butions. Cf., Pratt v. Commissioner, 550 F.2d 1023 (5th Clf.
1977). Under the facts of the instant case, both the form and
the substance of the partnership agreement, as amended,
indicate that as consideration for his services, A was to
receive an increase in his proprietary interest in partnership
profits. Therefore, A should be vie.wed as ha~ing contri?uted
these services, that is, as rendermg them fm a capaCIty as
partner rather than as agent, so that Code section 707(a) does
not apply.
In short, a 'guaranteed payment' represents compe~ation
in addition to a partner's distributive share for capItal or
services contributed to a partnership. In this respect, a
'guaranteed payment' differs from a Code section 707(a) ~ay
ment which is a payment to a partner for property or serVIces
that do not also entitle that partner to a distributive share,
that is, a payment for property or services that were not
contributed to the partnership.
We recognize that the approach herein adopted for distinguishing between Code section 707(~) a~d (c) pay~e~ts
will provide partners with so~e chOIce 10 determ~nll~g
which section will apply. The eXIstence of such a chOIce IS
merely an extension of the principle that partners are
generally free to decide what each will contribute to .a
partnership and what each will receive in exchange for hIS
or her contribution. Of course, in determining whether a
particular transaction is a contribution, substance must
prevail over form. Treas . Reg. section 1.707-1(a) and Treas.
Reg. section 1.721-1(a)." GCM 37193 Ouly 13, 1977); accord,
TAM 8642003 Oune 30, 1986) (if section 707(a) and (c) are
inapplicable to distributions, "the distributions must be
treated pursuant to sections 702, 703, 704 and 731 of the
Code.").
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the promise to perform such services in the future as
creating "property" subject to section 721 with tainted
specially allocated built-in gain. An alternative smaller
step, more appropriate to a ruling than legislative regulations, would be to rely instead on tax accounting
rules.
B. A Classic Open Transaction Solution:
The Wrong Way
At first blush, the Rev. Proc. 93-27 rule and exceptions appear to rest on the valuation/ open transaction
approach. 44 Clearly, neither a partnership with a highly
predictable income stream nor a publicly traded
partnership 45 pose much of a valuation problem. The
sale-within-two-years exception could be viewed as a
bright-line test4 6 for a too-immediate sale, which
presumably, under Diamond, alleviates the valuation
problem as wellY Many commentators have relied on
the reed of the " open transaction" doctrine on the
grounds that the value of a profits share was too
speculative or was a "mere promise to pay."48 That
doctrine should be sharply restricted to sales or exchanges under section 1001 due to the discrediting of

44 For the perimeters of the debate, compare Cunningham,
"Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for Services," 47 Tax
L. Rev. 247 (1991), with Castleberry, Commentary: "Campbell
- A Simpler Solution," id. at 277. See also Ordower, "Taxing
Service Partners to Achieve Horizontal Equity," 46 Tax Law. 19
(1991). I have not thought much about the liquidation valuation approach, which in fact Rev. Proc. 93-27 adopts per the
recommendations of the 1991 Chicago Bar Report, supra note
I, and thus have nothing to add to the debate.
45
1991 LA Bar Report, supra note 5; The Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, "Committee on the Taxation of
Partnerships and Other Pass-Through Entities, Report on the
Receipt of Partnership Interest for Services," section IV.A.4(b)
(Feb. 28, 1991), electronically reproduced 91 TNT 62-30 ("1991
New York City Bar Report").
46Similar two-year benchmarks are contained in sections
452(e) and 334(b)(2) and, closer, in section 732(d). The new
section 707 regulations also contain a two-year benchmark.
See notes 124-126 infra and accompanying text. For a two-year
benchmark analogy underlying the problem of ordinary income/capital gains conversion, consider Treas. Reg. section
1.469-2T(f)(5), which provides, in effect, that unless property
developed by the taxpayer is rented for at least 24 months
prior to selling the property (or contracting for its sale), the
taxpayer's gain from the sale will not be treated as passive
activity gross income. See Preamble, 53 Fed. Reg. 5693 (Feb.
25,1990). The Chicago Bar Report had suggested a safe harbor of no sale or other disposition within one year after
receipt. If a prohibited disposition occurred within one year
after receipt of the profits share and the return for the year
of receipt had already been filed, the report called for amending the year 1 return. 1991 Chicago Bar Report, supra note 1.
47
1987 ABA Section of Taxation Report, supra note 31, at
Suggested Amendments to Regulations, (b) Partnership
Profits Interest (2).
48
1987 ABA Section of Taxation Report, supra note 31; 1991
LA Bar Report, supra note 5, at Analytical Construct; 1991
New York City Bar Report, supra note 45, at II.C.l. For an
excellent exposition of the classic open transaction doctrine,
see Perry v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 183, 187-88 (8th Cir. 1945).
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the cash equivalency doctrine.49 The open-transaction
doctrine under section 1001- applicable to the receipt
of property with no ascertainable fair market value and the "mere promise to pay" income for services
doctrine under sections 61, 83, and 441 appear still
viable,5o but conceptually questionable beyond stare
decisis .51 After Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner,52 the
"cash equivalency" doctrine applied to sales of
property should be dead, although some in the Service
would erroneously53 limit Warren Jones to secured
promises to pay.54 Overturning the cash equivalency
doctrine as to dispositions of property even where the
promise to pay is unsecured (as the legislative history
pointed to in Warren Jones and the congressional tax
policy articulated in the Installment Sales Revision Act
of 1980 as to sales of property indicate we must),55

49Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 788, 792 (9th
Cir. 1975). But cf Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138 (1st Cir.
1983) (no economic benefit from escrow because not the
equivalent of cash); Falk, "Constructive Receipt and Economic
Benefit: Putting Reed in the Proper Perspective," 62 Taxes 425,
428-30 (1984)(properly criticizing extension of doctrine).
soRev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174; accord, GCM 38917 (Nov.
17,1982); PLR 9343012 (July 20, 1993). Cf. GCM 35709 (March
6, 1974), p. 24.
51 Goldsmith v. United States, 586 F.2d 810, 819 (Ct. Cl. 1978)
("On fresh consideration, all such agreements might be contended to be devices without business purpose created solely
for their effect on taxes .... But taxation decisions, necessarily retrospective in their operation, are not written on a clean
slate. There are too many plans in effect, too many decisions
and rulings ... on which taxpayers reasonably relied.").
Some in the Service implicitly adopt the Goldsmith stance.
GCM 38034 (Aug. 7, 1979).
52
524 F.2d at 791-93; GCM 38034 (Aug. 7, 1979); TAM
83001001 (Sept. 4, 1979); PLR 7934023 (May 22, 1979).
53Warren Jones accurately pointed out that the Revenue Act
of 1921 contained a standard for "amount realized" (now
section 1001) - "readily realizable fair market value" which roughly equates with the cash equivalency doctrine
birthed two decades later, but the Revenue Act of 1924
deliberately reversed course adopting the "fair market value"
standard still in use. 524 F.2d at 791-2. My reading of Confidential Hearings before the Senate Fin. Comm. on H.R.
8243, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-8, 40-1 (1921) (Statements of Dr.
Thomas (T.S.) Adams) ("1921 Confidential Senate Hearings")
is that the 1921 act definition of "amount realized" was not
intended to effect" a policy more favorable to the taxpayer"
as the Ninth Circuit averred. Warren Jones Co., 524 F.2d at 791.
54GCM 37371 (Dec. 22, 1977) pp 14-5; GCM 36771 (June 28,
1976); see also TAM 8639006 (June 5, 1986). The Service
properly abandoned any distinction on the basis of transferability. GCM 38034 (August 7, 1979) (answer to nonmarketability barrier to valuation is the "barter-equation"
formula of Davis v. United States, 370 U.S. 65 (1962».
55See note 53 supra, and S. Rep . No. 1000, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 24 (1980) ("[Ilt is the Committee's intent that the costrecovery method not be available in the case of sales for a
fixed price (whether the seller's obligation is evidenced by a
note, contractual promise, or otherwise), and that its use be
limited to those rare and extraordinary cases involving sales
for a contingent price where the fair market value of the
purchaser'S obligation cannot reasonably be ascertained.").
Indefiniteness must be as to amount not as to the likelihood
of payment at all. PLR 7903024 (Sept. 26, 1978).
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leaves only the lack of an ascertainable fair market
value as the traditional barrier to current taxation of
receipt of a promise to pay in the future. And the Service is notoriously hard-nosed in ascertaining a fair
market value, even in contingent promises, except in
rare and extraordinary circumstances.56 For instance,
the Service has advocated valuing for purposes of section 1001 land contracts,57 grain sale contracts,58 private
annuities for a term certain59 (with the same controversy over the relevance of securit y60), guaranteed future
payments and royalties for the right to publish a future
book;61 and a nonassignable nontransferable deferred
sales contract for public stock. 62

I

The Service is notoriously hard-nosed
in ascertaining a fair market value,
even in contingent promises, except in
rare and extraordinary circumstances.

Do the above rules regarding unsecured promises to
pay for property apply to mere promises to pay for
services? Some in the Service have believed that sales
of services and of other property should be treated the
same. 63 But a majority considering the issue in available public documents draw a stark line between sales
of property and sales of services, with mere promise to
pay ruling almost supreme as to unfunded deferred
compensation - even if such promise had an ascer-

56Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 C.B. 15; GCM 35709 (March 6,
1974), considering Rev. Rul. 75-113 (advocates "middle of the
road" standard); GCM 39252 (July 3,1984) (dictum since found
promise to pay for services). GCM 34485 (April 22, 1971)
provides an outstanding exposition of the Service's "middle
ground" rule: "whether the right to the right to future income
can 'be rationally made.'" It also points out the timing and
character aspects of open transactions. By the way, I suspect,
without having examined closely all of the public TAMs and
PLRs on point, that this "standard" may be difficult to apply
rationally. E.g., PLR 6104204770A (April 20, 1961).
57TAM 8329027 (March 31, 1983); Warren Jones Co. involved
a real estate land contract.
58GCM 38034 (August 7, 1979); TAM 8001001 (Sept. 4,
1979).
59GCM 37371 (Dec. 22, 1977); PLR 7934023 (May 22,1979).
60GCM 37371 (Dec. 22, 1977).
1
6 GCM 39252 (July 4, 1984) (held promised payment for
services not goods so section 61 mere promise to pay bars
taxation whereas sale of property for mere promise to pay
would be taxed currently).
62GCM 36771 (June 28, 1976).
63GCM 38034 (Aug. 7, 1979) (unable to construct argument
dividing the areas "on the basis of 'goods' versus 'services"').
But see note 64. I have wondered whether that should be so
ever since reading in the early 1970s Waller Horsley'S
thoughtful and far ahead of its time "Tax Liability Without
Cash: How 'Constructive Receipt' Traps Taxpayers," 31 J. Tax.
116 (Aug. 1969), which I always recall as first making me
think about the disparate treatment of future promises for
goods versus services. I now suspect history and politics
have more to do with the disparate treatment than policy or
doctrinal imperatives.
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tainable value. 64 Some in the Service would extend the
open transaction doctrine to accrual basis service
providers so long as no note was given to evidence the
recipient's obligation to pay for the services.65 But even
as to deferred payment for services, some in the Service
would tax the employee in the year of receipt of the
mere promise to pay if he maintained too much
"dominion and control."66 Although the legislative history to section 61 does not reveal quite the twists of
section 1001 as to unfunded mere promises to pay, on
the policy basis of horizontal equity and certainly vertical equity67 as well, unfunded promises to pay for

64(;CM 36771 (June 28, 1976); accord, GCM 39252 (July 3,
1984) (no taxable event as to promise to pay a guaranteed
amount for services as author, whereas identical mere promise
to pay guaranteed amount for property, i.e., copyright, would
be currently taxable.); TAM 8639006 (June 5, 1986).
65See GCM 34853 (April 27, 1972), considering Rev. Rul.
74-352.
66GCM 36998 (Feb . 9, 1977); accord, GCM 37014 (Feb . 25,
1977); GCM 37256 (Sept. 15, 1977) · (Under "dominion and
control" theory, "there must be a right of the taxpayer to the
income, the existence of an option or right to defer receipt of
income that would otherwise be paid in the year earned, a
voluntary decision to defer the receipt of such income, and
the dominion and control over the withheld amounts, which
may be evidenced by the authorization of the employer to
invest such amounts for the benefit of the taxpayer with the
risk of loss and benefit of appreciation therefrom remaining
with such person, or by reposing in the taxpayer control over
investments of such funds.") (relates theory to assignment of
income doctrine); PLR 851102 (Dec . 7, 1984); TAM
7509300060A (Sept. 30, 1975). Scanning the 14 or so GCMs
using the term "dominion and control" indicated that 60
percent or more involved estate and gift tax, about 25 percent
deferred compensation. The thrust here appears to be ownership rights other than right to receive (which would trigger
the constructive receipt doctrine) and not economic benefit
in the form of security beyond a mere promise to pay (which
would trigger the economic benefit doctrine). Well-reasoned
GCM 37812 (Jan. 5, 1979) also tied the theory into Helvering
v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940) (retained strings made grantor
taxable on income of family trust), which I find a better
analogy than an assignment of income doctrirle bottomed on
dominion and control over disposition rather than on the
earning of the income. Again in a populist vein, I feel the
first version of the assignment of income doctrine rests too
much on ownership of capital rather than who earned the
income. Cf. Lee & Bader, supra note 17, at 187-89. In practice
15 to 20 years ago, the ploy to taxation in such impure "deferral" cases was to tack on some forfeiture clause, usually in
terms of future participation in deferrals. All of this appears
suspect under the reasoning of GCM 36998, supra at pp. 31-32,
and the more strict scrutiny of section 83(a) as to "substantial
risk of forfeiture."
67Horizontal equity would call for like tax treatment of all
compensation, current and deferred, except for some overriding policy such as encouraging qualified retirement plans.
Vertical equity would especially require this when the
benefits of the special tax treatment are concentrated at the
top. This is absolutely the case with "nonqualified" deferred
compensation plans, which to avoid ERISA coverage, vesting, and funding requirements can cover only "top hat"
employees - ironically a signature characteristic of the
(Footnote 67 continued on next page.)
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goods and for services should be treated alike.68 The
Tax Reform Act of 1969 and the Revenue Act of 1978
show that the distinction is far more political than conceptual or policy-based. 69 This should come as no
surprise, since non qualified deferred compensation
rules principally subsidize top management, a core
constituency of the Republican party/o and the
Republicans in Congress supplied the bulk of the votes
of the "Conservative Coalition" in the House, which
passed key elements of the Revenue Act of 197871 in
uncommon exceptions to the closed rule.
Much has been written about the application of section 83 to the receipt of a profits share for services. The
short answer is that if the aggregate tests are met as to
the performance of the services and the partnership
allocation and distribution, the receipt is not a "payment," but instead is a nontaxable event under CuI-

caricature "John Bull" image of British capitalism at the last
turn of the century as well as of the early Bolshevik caricatures of capitalism. For a detailed discussion of the issues
here (reaching conclusions consonant with the above
criticisms), see Bishop & Durkin, "Nonqualified Deferred
Compensation Plans: A Review and Critique," 17 Wm
Mitchell L. Rev. 43 (1991).
68Contrast GCM 38034 (Aug. 7, 1979) p . 19, with GCM 39252
(July 3, 1984) p . 11.
69The Revenue Act of 1978, the beginning of a lO-year era
of the Conservative Coalition of Republicans and Southern
Democrats prevailing on tax matters, deferred IRS rulings (in
the form of proposed regulations) and reinstituted "case law"
prior to Service-attempted reforms on a wide range of
deferred and direct compensation matters including nonqualified deferred compensation, state and local deferred
compensation plans, cash-or-deferred qualified plans,
cafeteria plans, and payments to independent contractors.
See H.R. Rep. No. 1445, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 50-66 (1978); S.
Rep. No. 1263, id. at 63-79; H.R. 1800 (Conference Report), id.
at 204-07. The Carter administration agreed with what the
House had done. Hearings on H.R. 13511 (Revenue Act of
1978) before the Senate Finance Comm. (Part 1), 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 135 (1978) (Statement of Treasury Secretary Blumenthal). In 1977, Congress deferred several attempts by the
Service to restrict various forms of fringe benefits. See GCM
37298 (Oct. 20, 1977) ("[T]he House Ways and Means Committee ... would suspend until April 30, 1978 the effective
date of Rev. Rul. 76-453 [1976-2 e.B. 86, dealing with the
deductibility of transportation costs between home and place
of work] and - prescribe issuance of any regulations in the
fringe benefit area prior to July 1, 1978."). Earlier, the House,
in 1969, unsuccessfully attempted to tax a portion of nonqualified deferred compensation because such deferral
"should not be available to employees who are in a position
to bargain for deferred compensation arrangements .. . [from
a large, financially sound corporation], when such benefits
are not available to other employees." H .R. Rep. No. 413 (Part
1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1969).
70See Lee, "'Death and Taxes' and Hypocrisy," 60 Tax Notes
1393, 1397 (Sept. 6, 1993) ("Lee, Death and Taxes").
nSee Lee, "President Clinton's Capital Gains Proposals,"
59 Tax Notes 1399, 1416-17 (June 7, 1993) ("Lee, Clinton's
Capital Gains Proposals").
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bertson, so that section 83 is never triggered. 72 This
analysis supports the exclusion of "mere promises to
pay" from the reach of section 83 by regulations section
1.83-3(e) as not constituting " p rop erty. "73

The Republicans in Congress supplied
the bulk of the votes of the
'Conservative Coalition' in the House,
which passed key elements of the
Revenue Act of 1978 in uncommon
exceptions to the closed rule.
Therefore, the "mere promise to pay" doctrine
should not be extended to receipt of a partnership
profits share for partner-capacity services. Nor does
the classic (indeterminable amount) open-transaction
doctrine under Burnet v. Logan 74 fare much better. That
case turned on the possibility that the taxpayer might
otherwise be taxed prior to recovering her basis.75 In a
profits share received for partner-capacity services, the
service renderer typicall~ has no basis in the intangible
created by the services. 6 More significantly, the fact
that limited partners in many instances (prior to the
passive activity loss rules) paid for a share of losses
(and profits) helps establish value.

C. An Aggregate Approach: The Right Way
1. Aggregate concept: 'hypothetical proprietress'
standard. This article maintains that, as contrasted
with a valuation approach, an aggregate approach better supports Rev. Proc. 93-27's general nontaxable
event rule and all its exceptions, with certain modifica-

72PLR 8727828 (April 3, 1987). Receipt of an interest in a
"pool of capital" is not payment or compensation for services
but instead tax-free receipt for services rendered . TAM
8137006 (July 23, 1980); TAM 8129006 (March 30,1981); see also
Rev. Rul. 77-176, 1977-1 e.B. 78. Therefore, section 83 does not
apply. TAM 8047005 (July 24,1980); TAM 8129006 (March 30,
1981). I believe this is the answer to the question of some in
the Service as to "Where do you get the entrepreneurial risk
theory out of the statute [section 83]?" Sheppard, "Partnership
Interests Exchanged for Services: Implementing Campbell," 48
Tax Notes 1212, 1213 (Sept. 3, 1990): Out of the term "payment. " As to the "pool of capital" analogy, recent case law has
focused too much on services/compensation much like
Diamond, with no apparent awareness of an aggregate model.
See, e.g ., Zuhone v. Commissioner, 883 F.2d 1317 (7th Cir. 1989);
Cline v. Commissioner, 617 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1980); Cline v.
Commissioner, 67 T.e. 889, 895 (1977) (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
73GCM 39230 (May 7, 1984).
74283 U.S. 404,411 (1931); Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 e.B. 15;
see Lee & Bader, supra note 17, at 174.
75 283 U.S. at 412-13.
76Castleberry, supra note 44 (classic extension of open
transaction doctrine to character of income when transaction
closes, Carter v. Commissioner, 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948),
involved zero basis). In year 1, shareholder in liquidating
corporation received payments in excess of basis in stock and
at issue was the character of additional "contingent" payments received in year 2.
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tions for sales within two years. The appellate
Campbell's "enigmatic"77 nontaxability under section
707 of receipt of a profits share for services dictum
alludes to an aggregate analysis of the profits share for
services issue. Indeed, the appellate court's perception
of the realization issue when a taxpayer performs
partner-capacity services in return for a profits share
subject to the risks of the venture is based on a reading
of the 1984 legislative history similar to that taken
above. 78
An aggregate approach to a particular subchapter K
provision seeks to tax a partner in the same manner as
a hypothetical individual entrepreneur or proprietor in
similar circumstances would be taxed. 79 An aggregate
approach is consistent with the long-held Treasury80
(and IRS81 as well) conceptualization of Eartnership
taxation. Some, but not all, commentators 2 also have
come to favor an aggregate approach in interpreting
provisions of, and backfilling gaps in, subchapter K.
Under this analysis, just as a proprietor improving his
business property is not taxed until the property

" Cuff, supra note 5; Comment, "The Receipt of Profits Interest in a Partnership as a Taxable Event after Campbell and Mark
IY," 57 Mo. L. Rev. 273,294 (1992). Cf Sheppard, "News Analysis:
Eighth Circuit Further Confuses Diamond Issue in Campbell, 52
Tax Notes 1353,1355 (Sept. 16, 1991) ("obtuse wording").
78See Appendix to second installment of this article in Tax
Notes, April 4, 1994.
79Lane, supra note 8, at 246, 247, 249, 254; 1982 ALI Partnership Proposals, supra note 29, at 151-53. Lee, "Entity Classification and Integration: Publicly Traded Partnerships, Personal Service Corporations and the Tax Legislative Process,"
8 Va . Tax Rev. 1,88-9 and n.126 (1988) ("Lee, Entity Classification") and authorities cited therein; 1991 New York City Report, supra note 45 at III. Policy Considerations.
80See note 156 infra for Treasury position in 1930s. For
modern affirmation under subchapter K, see Department of
the Treasury, the president's 1978 Tax Program: Detailed
Descriptions and Supporting Analyses of the Proposals 118
(1978), reprinted in Message from the President of the United
States Transmitting Proposals for Tax Reductions and
Reform, H.D. 283, 95th Congo 2d Sess. 277 (1978); Cunningham, supra note 44, and Castleberry, supra note 44.
81 See Appendix.
82Cunningham, supra note 44; Schmolka, supra note 3; Lane,
supra note 8; 1991 New York City Bar Report, supra note 45;
1982 ALI Proposals, supra note 29 at 523-32 (in the absence of
countervailing factors use aggregate approach); Lee, "Entity
Classification," supra note 79. The various bar reports, happily
electronically reproduced by Tax Notes Today, generally follow
an aggregate approach as well. Contra, Cowan, supra note 8;
Keyser, "A Theory of Nonrecognition Under an Income Tax:
The Case of Partnership Formation," 5 Amer. J. Tax Policy 269
(1986) ("economic" analysis of risk shifting); Postlewaite, Dutton & Magette, "A Critique of the ALI's Federal Income Tax
Project - Subchapter K: Proposals on the Taxation of
Partners," 75 Ceo. L. J. 423,465,487 (1986) (would apply entity
approach largely because of technical changes in a partner's
control assets contributed to the partnership - the underlying
rationale of Helvering V. Walbridge, 70 F.2d 689 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 293 U.S. 594 (1938), Friedman, supra note 5 (entity approach to achieve parity with corporate securities). Cf McKee,
"Partnership Allocations: The Need for an Entity Approach,"
66 Va . L. Rev. 1039 (1980).
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produces income or is disposed of in a taxable transaction,83 receipt of a profits interest for services is nontaxable so long as such services are rendered in a
partner-like capacity and the partnership'S payment of
the profit share is in effect subject to entrepreneurial
risks. 84 As discussed above, the legislative history of
the 1984 amendments to section 707 employs just such
an analysis in distinguishing taxable sales of services
or property between a partner and his partnership from
tax-free contributions of such services or property with
partnership payment in the form of any partnership
distributions.85

83Lane, supra note 8; 1982 ALI Proposals, supra note 29; and
Cunningham, supra note 44, all use variants of this example.
It really does strike the mind's eye. I was convinced by Lane,
but only after the 1984 legislative history shook loose my
preconceptions (partially attributable to conversations with
Bill McKee in the early 1970s). You don't have to be a weather
reporter to hear the aggregate-entity "winds of change" blow
- Canellos, "Corporate Tax Integration: By Design or By
Default," 35 Tax Notes 999, 1006 Oune 8, 1987) - once you
study the 1984 legislative history to section 707(a)(2).
MCampbellll, 943 F.2d at 822-23. The Eighth Circuit agreed
with commentators that section 721, providing for nonrecognition as to an exchange of property for an ·interest in a
partnership, does not apply to a service partner because he
"does not contribute property in exchange for his partnership
interest." 943 F.2d at 821. A section 707 analysis supported in
the court's eyes the taxpayer's arguments that "a service
partner . .. who receives a profits interest ... in a partnership
does not realize income upon receipt of that interest, and,
therefore, no taxable event occurs." 943 F.2d at 822 and 818.
"Campbell's interests were not transferable and were not
likely to provide immediate returns. Thus, we doubt that the
tax court correctly held that Campbell's profits interests were
taxable upon receipt." 943 F.2d at 822. Note that the Eighth
Circuit did not exactly track the second leg of the partnercapacity services/entrepreneurial-risk as to payment model
described in text, and advocated by Turlington on brief on
the basis of the 1984 legislative history of section 707(a)(2).
Reading that legislative history in the light of the legislative
history of section 469 led to a sea change in my VIew of the
aggregate/ entity conflict in subchapter K. The Eighth Circuit
referred instead, intentionally I suspect, to facts manifesting
entrepreneurial risk - "Campbell's interests were not transferable and were not likely to provide immediate returns."
943 F.2d at 822-23. Of course, at the same time so formulated,
these conclusions are relevant to a valuation analysis as well.
See Weidner, "Pratt and Deductions for Payments to
Partners," 12 Real Prop. and Tr. J. 811,812 (1977), cited by GCM
38067 (Aug. 29, 1979) as among the best of the numerous Pratt
articles.
85 As others have noticed, I ultimately base my aggregateleaning on a populist view of partnerships as composed of
small business people. So did the Ways and Means Chairman
Bob Doughton, D-N.C., and other populist hill country
Democrats of the 1930s. In the 1936 House hearings on the
proposed tax on undistributed corporate profits, they frequently grilled witnesses, including a Treasury representative, on why a small corporation should pay less tax on
its retained earnings than a small partnership on earnings
plowed back into the firm. Hearings on Revenue Act, 1936,
before the House Ways and Means Committee, 74th Cong.,
(Footnote 85 continued on next page.)
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2d Sess. 75 (Rep. Jere Cooper, D-Tenn.); 133 (Rep. Samuel Hill,
D-Wash.); 139 (Chairman Bob Doughton, D-N.C.); 239 (Hill);
341 (Hill); 343-45 (Doughton); 470-71 (Dough ton); and 643
(Colloquy between Chairman Doughton and a Treasury representative) (1936) ("1936 House Hearings"); see also Hearings on President's 1963 Tax Message before the House Committee on Ways and Means (Part I), 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
600-01 (1963) (Colloquy between Rep. Howard Baker, RTenn., and Secretary of the Treasury Dillon). The answer
always was the small business could incorporate (and thus
obtain part of the current subsidy of $2 or $3 billion a year
attributable to the inside graduated corporate rates), which
partially explains the over 1,000-percent growth in small corporations from the 1930s to the mid-1980s, while the population increased only 150 percent or so. The problem was
present from the beginning. 1921 Confidential Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 12, 14-5 (Colloquy between Dr. Adams
and Sen. Farnifold Simmons, D-N.C.) (complexities of which
entity has tax advantage; Adams testified that equality would
require that all small (10 owners or less) business entities be
taxed the same. Amen.). The words of these men on the
inequities of a lower inside corporate tax rate on (today's
small annual amounts) of retained income as contrasted with
higher "outside" rates applicable to an individual or partnership plowing profits back into the venture still stir me:
"THE CHAIRMAN. Of course, every man in business,
every corporation, or every individual engaged in business,
think they would grow rapidly, and probably could, if they
had no expenses; but the support of the Government is necessary and a proper expense of business, on those who make
money. Now, they should be placed on the same level, should
they not? The corporation, those engaging in business in a
corporate form, have an advantage, over the individual, the
partnership; a decided advantage. They have an advantage
in many ways, but the special advantage which they have is
that they have a larger amount of capital with which to do
business, and the larger the capital is, the stronger the organization they can perfect, and the more they can have of
mass production; and they can organize a more extensive
sales agency. They have an advantage in both production and
in distribution that the man of small means does not have. ...
Why should we still give them another advantage in the matter
of taxes? In that way, the big man can always keep the little
fellow down and prevent his ever getting on his feet. ... You
want to cripple him, start him out with a disadvantage, start
him out with the other fellow miles ahead of him, and then
expect him to keep up in the race."
1936 House Hearings at 343-44. The story gets better as
Chairman Doughton forces the witness to explicate his simile
of not having the tax "tail wag the dog." The corporation was
the dog and the little fellow was the tail. ld. at 345. The
witness explained that he really meant minorities (the tail)
as against majorities. In view of the fact that partnerships
and sole proprietors numbered in the millions while corporations were less than 500,000 at this time, this is even more
revealing and deserving of populist scorn. My testimony to
a House Ways and Means Subcommittee in 1987 was motivated by almost the same outrage. Hearings on Master
Limited Partnerships before the House Ways and Means Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
351 (1987). In actuality, today the bias by and large is not in
favor of incorporated business versus unincorporated business (most of the latter are so small that they are taxed at
individual income tax rates comparable to the IS-percent
inside small income corporate rate), but in favor of (incorporated) business over moderate income workers. Or so I
assert to my students for discussion purposes. Cf. Lee, supra
note 79, at 69 n .34 (double taxation is a "Briarpatch" argu(Footnote 85 continued in next column.)
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2. Aggregate theory and receipt of profit share for
partner-capacity services. Payment of a profit share
in a partnership with a "substantially certain and predictable stream of income" under the Revenue Procedure 93-27 exception clearly would not be subject to
entrepreneurial risk. 86 Arguably, the same would be
true of an interest in a publicly traded partnership
(PTP)87 - just as a shareholder in a (publicly traded)
corporation,88 a PTP partner is subject to investment,
not entrepreneurial risk. 89 More fundamentally, recognition upon receipt of such a profits share should result
because a PTP partner does not materially participate
in operations or management in his partner capacity,
ment for most close corporations. The small C corporation
regime with lower inside tax on annual accumulations of up
to $100,000, no dividends, and a capital gains tax or step-up
in basis at death and no tax outside on such accumulations,
offset only somewhat by repeal of the codified General
Utilities concept, produces less taxes than direct taxation of
the owner as a proprietor). I believe that is the U.S. definition
of capitalism - workers are taxed heavier than capitalists.
True in the 1920s and true in the 1980s. The Clinton tax plan
brought the capitalists (more the high-income professional
two-income workers) more back in line with the other
workers - taking into account payroll and other regressive
taxes. See Lee, "Clinton's Capital Gains Provisions," supra
note 71, at 1410; Lee, "Death and Taxes," supra note 70, at
1396,1398.
Conversely, I wonder whether Judge Learned Hand's entity-tinged tax view of partnerships reflects a Northeasterner's experiences with large investment partnerships
that seem more like entities (certainly to populist eyes). More
likely, such views represent an "entangle ... [ment] in the
jurisprudential aspects of so-called legal 'entities' to such an
extent as to cause it [the tribunal] to overlook the real meaning and purposes of these enactments." Commissioner v. Whitney, 169 F.2d 562 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 892 (1948).
86
1991 LA Bar Report, supra note 5 (tax service provider
on receipt of profits share where capital is a material income
producing factor and she has no material entrepreneurial
risk); 1991 New York City Bar Report, supra note 45 (readily
tradeable profits share should be currently taxed) . The 1982
ALI Report, supra note 28 at 163-65, noted that under a
private letter ruling reported in the Wall Street Journal a
guaranteed payment to a manager of tax-exempt bond funds
had passed through tax-exempt interest. See also 1991 New
York City Bar Report, supra note 45 (section 707(a)(2) now
addresses); addressed also in Rev. Rul. 81-301, 1981-2 C.B.
144, considered in GCM 38067 (Aug. 29, 1979).
87
1991 LA Bar Report, supra note 5; 1991 New York City
Bar Report, supra note 45.
88 A shareholder is not engaged in the trade or business of
her corporation (even if closely held) under Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963), while a partner in contrast is
engaged in the business of her partnership, Stanchfield v.
Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. 1681 (1965); accord, Butler v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 1097 (1961), acq. 1962-1 C.B. 3; GCM 39406
(Sept. 6, 1985); TAM 9310001 (November 4,1992). On a policy
basis, the latter rule should be limited to general partners,
but the precedents go the other way. See GCM 39406, supra;
GCM 36577 (Feb. 26, 1976), p. 38 (citing Lee," Section 183,"
supra note 15).
89Professor Rudnick points out that entrepreneurial risk
differs from economic risk. Rudnick, "Who Should Pay the
Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?," 39 Case Western L. Rev.
965, 1158 n. 680 (1989) .
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